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In addition to cash benefits, the Social Security system in our coun 
try provides a variety of benefits in kind to eligible individuals with 
disabilities. Eligibility for the in-kind benefits, such as health insur 
ance, is typically contingent upon eligibility for cash benefits under the 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) programs, which, in turn, depends upon inability to work 
due to a medical impairment. This paper considers whether the sys 
tem's in-kind benefits, and the way in which they are designed and 
made available, optimally assist disability beneficiaries to achieve the 
goals that our nation sets for these programs, and whether there is a 
better way to fulfill these goals.
The Goal of Independence
There is now a consensus that the goal of U.S. disability policy is to 
enhance the capacity of people with disabilities to live independently 
in their communities. This has been the key objective of the indepen 
dent living movement from its outset in the early 1970s (DeJong 1979, 
1981) and was most clearly recognized as a national goal with the 
enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Dis 
ability advocates and researchers have concluded that we must bring 
the goals and policies of other disability laws and programs, including
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the Social Security disability programs, in line with the independent 
living goals of the ADA (National Council on Disability 1986, 1988; 
DeJong and Batavia 1990).
While there is general agreement that independence is the goal, this 
consensus may be somewhat illusory because different people mean 
different things by "independence." The term is often used loosely and 
ambiguously to refer to two distinct, and often conflicting, objectives. 
These are:
1. the ability to live in the community and out of institutions, even if 
this ability is a direct result of government or philanthropic subsi 
dization (which I will refer to as the support goal), and
2. the ability to live self-sufficiently in the community through one's 
own employment and resources (which I will call the employ 
ment goal).
The ADA, with its Title I employment provisions, clearly empha 
sizes the employment goal. However, both goals address valid objec 
tives of the Social Security disability programs, which cover some 
individuals who are incapable of work. 1 Each reflects a different objec 
tive of the system, and the contrast between them represents the basic 
tension between the aims of subsidizing those who need assistance and 
rewarding those who can make the effort to be productive. Ideally, pol 
icy decisions concerning eligibility and benefits should be based upon 
a careful balancing of likely effects on each of these two independent 
living goals.
Independence and In-Kind Benefits
Most analysts agree that obtaining in-kind Social Security benefits 
is extremely important to the ability of people with disabilities to live 
independently, from both the support and employment perspectives. If, 
for example, individuals who require full-time personal assistance 
(e.g., attendant care) cannot obtain such services, they will not be able 
to live in their communities. If beneficiaries will eventually lose their 
health coverage as a result of accepting employment, it is not in their 
interest to take a job that does not provide long-term assurance of at 
least comparable benefits or their cash equivalent.
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Advocates often argue that it makes little policy sense to tie eligibil 
ity for disability benefits to the ability or decision to work. Individuals 
with disabilities will need these benefits to live in their communities 
whether or not they have a job; linking them through employment- 
based eligibility criteria will only decrease the incentive to work. The 
disincentive is likely to be particularly strong to the extent that the ben 
efit is not available through employment, as is the case with some in- 
kind benefits. Despite recent legislative efforts to eliminate work disin 
centives, people with disabilities remain concerned about eventually 
losing their in-kind benefits. This concern will persist as long as the eli 
gibility-employment link remains.
In-Kind versus Cash Benefits
Recognizing the importance of in-kind benefits to the ability to live 
independently also does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that such 
assistance must be or should be provided in kind. Presumably, if all 
other factors were equal, the individual with a disability would prefer 
an added cash benefit to an in-kind benefit of equal value. The cash 
benefit would offer far greater flexibility for the individual to pursue 
his or her independent living goals. However, for a variety of reasons, 
many people with disabilities currently prefer the benefits they receive 
in kind rather than in cash, and many policy makers prefer to offer 
them in kind.
From the perspective of the policy maker, who is accountable to the 
taxpayers financing these programs, a cash benefit does not provide the 
assurance that the money will be spent in a manner that would satisfy 
taxpayer concerns. This security is critical to ongoing political support 
for the program. For example, a cash benefit in lieu of Medicare might 
be used by a beneficiary for better nutrition or housing. While this may 
be a rational decision on the part of the recipient, taxpayers may resent 
this use of program funds, recognizing that they will ultimately still 
have to pay the bill if the individual becomes ill. Some policy makers 
do not trust beneficiaries to make accountable decisions. 2
From the perspective of beneficiaries, an equivalent cash benefit has 
two significant drawbacks. First, individuals are concerned that a cash 
payment does not guarantee the ability to purchase the service previ 
ously obtained through the in-kind benefit. For example, if private
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health insurers will not offer coverage at any price to people with dis 
abilities, the cash benefit in lieu of in-kind insurance will be of little 
use. This problem could be remedied through certain insurance market 
reforms, such as guaranteed issue (assuring coverage) and community 
rating (assuring affordability). Second, beneficiaries are concerned 
that, even with such reforms, there will be a political tendency for the 
cash amount to be set below the level necessary to obtain adequate ser 
vices.
For these reasons, cash in lieu of an in-kind benefit is probably not 
politically feasible in this country and will not be considered further in 
this paper. However, a system based on vouchers, Medical Savings 
Accounts (MSAs),3 or tax credits providing a "cash equivalent" limited 
to the purchase of specified services would satisfy the accountability 
needs of many policy makers. With respect to a tax credit, making it 
"refundable" and therefore available to individuals with no tax liability 
could equitably provide support for all individuals who require ser 
vices.
The feasibility of this cash equivalent approach depends largely on 
whether it can be structured to satisfy the significant concerns of bene 
ficiaries and their advocates. There would have to be some assurance 
that the voucher, MSA, or tax credit would be sufficient to obtain the 
needed service over the long term.
In-Kind Benefits and Public Policy
Eligibility and benefits ideally should be based on empirical evi 
dence of how to achieve the independent living goals of support and 
employment in the most cost-effective way. While several researchers 
have identified a Social Security disability work disincentive generally 
(Leonard 1986, Muller 1989, Burkhauser and Haveman 1982), none 
has specifically considered whether there is a greater disincentive asso 
ciated with in-kind benefits. Similarly, there has been little study of 
other implications of providing benefits in kind rather than through 
cash equivalents. In the absence of such empirical research, we must 
rely upon economic theory in conjunction with our knowledge of the 
behavior of beneficiaries.
According to conventional economic theory, receiving disability 
benefits in kind or through cash equivalents should not fundamentally
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affect the individual's decision to seek gainful employment, all other 
factors equal. Based on a strict rational choice model, the individual 
would compare the aggregate value of disability benefits, both cash and 
in kind, with the aggregate value of a job package, including salary, 
vacation, and all fringe benefits. If the job's benefits exceed the social 
program's benefits by a sufficient amount to compensate for the value 
of the person's labor, the individual will seek and accept employment.
However, it is clear that all other factors are not equal in comparing 
in-kind benefits and cash equivalents. Many of the benefits in kind cur 
rently available to people with disabilities would not be available or 
affordable to them in the market. The most obvious, again, is health 
insurance. Health insurers in the individual, nongroup market typically 
either exclude people with disabilities from coverage altogether or 
make such coverage extremely unattractive due to specific exclusions 
and limitations for preexisting conditions (Griss 1988; DeJong, Bata- 
via, and Griss 1989). Whether it is feasible to implement significant 
alternatives to the current in-kind benefit structure will depend partly 
on whether such other factors can be made equal through public policy 
(Batavia 1993).
This paper focuses on three in-kind benefits that are considered very 
important to people with disabilities: health insurance, personal assis 
tance services, and assistive technology. It examines what disability 
benefits are currently provided, how individuals are eligible for such 
benefits, whether these benefits are adequate to allow people to live in 
their communities, whether this approach is helping individuals to seek 
work, and how we can restructure eligibility and benefits to encourage 
independence. The paper's basic premise is that both the support and 
employment goals are more likely to be achieved to the extent that peo 
ple with disabilities are able to control their lives. Due to the inherent 
flexibility of cash equivalents, this form of assistance potentially offers 
greater control than do benefits provided in kind.
Health Insurance
Access to health care is key to independent living for many people 
with disabilities. On average, such individuals have greater health
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problems and higher rates of health care utilization than nondisabled 
individuals (Lubitz and Pine 1986; Belong, Batavia, and Griss 1989; 
LaPlante and Miller 1992; Rice and LaPlante 1992). Ironically, people 
with disabilities also have much poorer access to private health insur 
ance than do other members of the population (Griss 1988; Burns, Bat 
avia and DeJong 1991; Agency for Health Care Policy and Research 
(AHCPR) 1992; National Council on Disability 1993a; LaPlante, Rice 
and Cyril 1994).4
People with disabilities who are without health insurance, or with 
out adequate coverage, are likely to delay treatment of minor health 
concerns until they have escalated to major problems. For example, an 
individual with a spinal cord injury can develop a life-threatening 
decubitus ulcer (bedsore) in a matter of days without detection and 
appropriate treatment. If an urgent problem occurs, such individuals 
potentially compromise their financial ability to live independently. 
Ultimately, our society often pays both indirectly through uncovered 
care and directly through the public assistance programs (DeJong, Bat 
avia, and Griss 1989).
How Do People with Disabilities Currently Receive Health Benefits ?
The primary public health insurance programs for people with dis 
abilities are Medicare (Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, hereaf 
ter, "the Act"), and Medicaid (Title XIX of the Act). Eligibility for 
Medicare for people with disabilities is based on eligibility for DI. Eli 
gibility for Medicaid is based on eligibility for SSL Both cash benefits 
programs, DI and SSI, use the same definition of disability: the inabil 
ity to engage in any gainful activity due to a medically determinable 
impairment that is expected to last for a period of 12 consecutive 
months or to result in death. 5
When Medicare was established in 1965, it primarily had an acute 
care orientation and did not focus on the chronic care needs of people 
with disabilities. In 1972, DI beneficiaries on the disability rolls for at 
least 24 months were made eligible for full Medicare coverage. This 
waiting period has been severely criticized, because some beneficiaries 
have a life expectancy of less than two years and the conditions of oth 
ers with longer life expectancies may deteriorate if they do not receive 
the treatment they need in the first two years. In 1992, there were 3.57
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million individuals with disabilities enrolled in Medicare, at a cost of 
$14.3 billion (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
1994, table 8.B2).
Medicaid also was established in 1965. However, unlike Medicare, 
it had a long-term, chronic care orientation from the outset. Section 
1901 of the Act, the introduction to Medicaid, states explicitly that the 
purpose of the program is to enable states to furnish medical assistance 
"and rehabilitation and other services ... to help attain or retain capabil 
ity for independence or self-care."6 Consequently, from the beginning, 
Medicaid has been more closely attuned than Medicare to disability 
issues. In 1993, there were 4.9 million individuals with "permanent 
and total disabilities" receiving Medicaid, at a cost of $38 billion (HHS 
1994, table 8.E2).
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Provide Adequate Support?
Medicare now covers a broad set of acute care and rehabilitation 
services, including inpatient hospitalization and physician services. 
Also covered are inpatient and outpatient rehabilitation services at a 
rehabilitation hospital or unit, an acute care hospital, a skilled nursing 
facility, a Comprehensive Outpatient Rehabilitation Facility (CORF), a 
therapist's office, or the patient's home. While the Medicare benefi 
ciary's cost-sharing requirements have increased substantially over 
time (HHS 1994, table 2.C1), most beneficiaries are satisfied with 
respect to these covered services.
However, Medicare coverage is weak in the areas of preventive or 
wellness care, long-term and maintenance care, and prescription drugs. 
It has been criticized for its primarily acute care orientation and its lack 
of catastrophic stop-loss protection, particularly in light of the increas 
ing chronic and long-term care needs of an aging population (Griss 
1988). Several legislative proposals, such as the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act of 1988, have been launched to address these shortcom 
ings. Thus far all have been unsuccessful, largely due to the difficulty 
in financing these expensive benefits in a manner that is politically fea 
sible.
Medicaid coverage for people with disabilities is fairly comprehen 
sive, partly because the federal government requires, as a condition of
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program participation, that mandatory benefits be provided to those 
who are eligible as categorically needy (such as SSI recipients). 7 These 
benefits include inpatient and outpatient hospital services, lab and x- 
ray services, services in a skilled nursing facility, early and periodic 
screening, diagnosis and treatment, and family planning, physician, 
and home health services (Batavia 1989).
Medicaid appears to provide adequate coverage generally, although 
much depends upon how each state implements its own Medicaid pro 
gram. While state plans must be consistent with federal requirements, 
states vary in their rules interpreting these standards and in the extent 
to which they cover optional services. Some states, such as California, 
are relatively generous in their coverage. Others cover the bare mini 
mum. Overall, payment rates for Medicaid services tend to be substan 
tially below market rates, and many beneficiaries have difficulty 
finding providers who will accept Medicaid payment (Griss 1988).
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Encourage Employment?
As suggested, despite substantial legislative efforts, there appears to 
be a continuing work disincentive associated with the fear of losing 
health benefits. Throughout the 1980s, Congress enacted laws designed 
to allow disability program participants to accept employment, under 
certain conditions, without suffering a precipitous loss of cash or 
health benefits (National Association of Rehabilitation Facilities 
(NARF) 1988). The major health insurance work incentive provisions 
are as follow:
• The Social Security Amendments of 1980 allow DI beneficiaries 
whose disabling conditions continue after losing DI eligibility to 
retain Medicare eligibility for up to 36 months and to avoid a sec 
ond 24-month waiting period before becoming re-eligible for 
Medicare if they become re-eligible for DI within five years.
• The Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act of 
1986 made permanent Section 1619 of the Act, allowing SSI 
recipients to receive cash benefits while gainfully employed and 
to retain Medicaid eligibility if their income is insufficient to 
obtain necessary medical services.
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• The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 allows DI bene 
ficiaries who would otherwise lose Medicare benefits after the 36- 
month extended Medicare eligibility period to pay premiums to 
maintain their Medicare coverage (i.e., the Medicare buy-in). It 
also requires states to pay for the Medicare buy-in for certain low- 
income individuals.
Despite these provisions, in December 1993, only 35,299 of 5.98 
million disabled SSI recipients participated in the Section 1619 work 
incentive program (HHS 1994, tables 7.F5 and 7.A3). Overall, 
throughout the history of the disability programs, regardless of signifi 
cant incremental changes in the laws likely to cause work disincen 
tives, relatively few beneficiaries have become employed and left the 
disability rolls (Muller 1989). 8 This suggests the need for more funda 
mental, comprehensive reform of our approach to encouraging people 
with disabilities to seek gainful employment.
How Can We Better Satisfy the Goals of Support and Employment?
As a general rule, the work disincentive associated with health 
insurance is proportional to both the generosity of the health benefit 
that could be lost and the likelihood that it will be lost and inversely 
proportional to the generosity of the health coverage or cash equivalent 
that would be obtained through employment. Consequently, both sides 
of the health care equation must be addressed to encourage disability 
beneficiaries to work. 9 Currently, the program benefit to be lost is sub 
stantial, and the employment benefit to be gained varies according to 
individual job skills and employment opportunities, but would be 
unavailable for many workers with disabilities.
The best way to deal with both sides of the equation is through pol 
icy reform that offers access to coverage whether or not the individual 
is employed or changes jobs. Developing truly "portable" health insur 
ance was one of the primary objectives of the great health care reform 
debate of the 103rd Congress. Unfortunately, the focus of the debate 
was the Health Security Act (i.e., the Clinton plan), 10 which proved to 
be unduly complex, bureaucratic, unaffordable, and ultimately unac 
ceptable to the American public. Other alternative plans could achieve 
the objectives of health reform, including the independent living goals 
of support and employment, without creating a bureaucratic behemoth.
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One encouraging approach developed by the Heritage Foundation 
would offer direct tax credits to all individuals, irrespective of employ 
ment status, based upon their health care costs relative to their 
incomes. 11 Under this proposal, insurers would have to make their 
plans available to all people including people with disabilities, who 
would receive the purchasing power to obtain a health plan of their 
choice (with at least catastrophic coverage). If the individuals accepted 
employment, the amount of their tax credits would be reduced accord 
ing to the increase in their incomes. If they experienced high costs in a 
particular year, the credit would increase, thereby automatically reduc 
ing their financial burden. 12
Another approach, developed by the National Center for Policy 
Analysis (NCPA), would allow beneficiaries to apply the actuarial 
value of their Medicare or Medicaid benefits to purchase a catastrophic 
health insurance plan with a large deductible (e.g., $3,000) and to 
establish a Medical Savings Account (MSA) with the remaining funds 
to pay for amounts up to the deductible (NCPA 1995). The MSA could 
be structured to allow the beneficiaries to accumulate savings from 
year to year without compromising eligibility. The savings could be 
used for any of their independent living needs. As with the Heritage 
proposal, the amount of the government contribution to an MSA could 
be reduced as income increases. By eliminating or greatly diminishing 
the link between eligibility and employment, these approaches would 
significantly reduce the work disincentive.
Personal Assistance
About 9.6 million people with disabilities require the help of 
another person with basic personal maintenance, hygiene, and house 
hold tasks to be able to live independently (Kennedy 1993). The term 
"personal assistance services" includes aid in the following activities:
• personal or bodily care functions, traditionally referred to as activ 
ities of daily living (ADL);
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• meal preparation, laundry, light housekeeping, handling money, 
shopping, and transportation activities, traditionally referred to as 
instrumental activities of daily living (IADL);
• reader services for blind persons; and
• interpreter services for deaf persons (Litvak, Zukas and Heumann 
1987; Nosek 1992; Batavia, DeJong, and McKnew 1992).
Under the "independent living model" of personal assistance, particu 
larly favored by many working-age people with disabilities, the dis 
abled individual actively recruits, selects, manages, and directs his or 
her own provider of services, known as a "personal assistant." 13 The 
assistant typically is neither trained as, nor supervised by, a health care 
professional. The disabled person is a consumer of services, not a 
patient, and the assistant is accountable to the consumer, not to a super 
vising nurse or agency (DeJong 1981; DeJong and Wenker 1983). This 
model was developed by people with disabilities as a reaction to the 
perceived paternalism of health care professionals giving care under 
the "medical model" (Batavia, DeJong, and McKnew 1992).
How Do People with Disabilities Currently Receive Personal 
Assistance Benefits?
The majority of individuals who require personal assistance cur 
rently do not receive it under either the independent living or the medi 
cal model; they receive assistance through informal supports, such as 
family, friends, and volunteers (Kennedy 1993, Rutgers Bureau of Eco 
nomic Research and World Institute on Disability 1990). This informal 
support model has been criticized because it often fosters an unhealthy 
dependency-based relationship between the disabled individual and the 
unpaid caregiver (Batavia, DeJong and McKnew 1992).
In response to these criticisms and to the growing need for personal 
aid in the population, government programs of paid assistance have 
been established. The main federal initiatives that offer personal assis 
tance and other home-based services to disability beneficiaries are 
home health, homemaker, and chore services financed under Medicaid 
and under the Social Services block grant program (Title XX of the 
Act); services under Medicare when home-based assistance is associ-
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ated with a recent hospital stay; and similar services for disabled senior 
citizens provided under the Older Americans Act.
The independent living model has been adopted by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs in its Aides and Attendant Allowance Program and 
by several states in their Medicaid and Social Services programs. For 
example, Massachusetts, California, and Pennsylvania have incorpo 
rated independent living concepts into their interpretation of the federal 
regulations governing community-based services (DeJong and Wenker 
1983; Zukas, Cone, and Leon 1984; Allard and Spence 1986). Other 
states provide home-based long-term care services under a more medi 
cally oriented model using agencies and medical supervision (Litvak, 
Zukas, and Heumann 1987; Egley 1994).
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure Provide 
Adequate Support?
Whether individuals who require personal assistance services 
receive the support they need under the model that they prefer depends 
in large part on the state in which they live. In its 50-state survey of all 
publicly funded in-home service programs, the World Institute on Dis 
ability (WID) found that 42 percent did not cover both personal and 
domestic services, 22 percent do not cover services seven days per 
week, 50 percent did not serve persons with incomes above the poverty 
level, and 67 percent did not allow aides or personal assistants to help 
in personal care involving medications, catheters, suppositories, or 
menstrual needs (Litvak, Zukas, and Heumann 1987). While some 
states have since improved their coverage, most still do not conform to 
the independent living model (Nosek and Howland 1993; Kennedy 
1993).
Thus, most states have not responded to the preferences of many 
people with disabilities for personal assistance services. To the extent 
that states or agencies have attempted to fund personal assistance ser 
vices, most have done so in an uncoordinated and nonsystematic man 
ner. Few provide such services in a way that offers consumers 
maximum control over their lives, optimally supporting their ability to 
exist independently in their communities (Nosek 1992). Many pro 
grams retain strong elements of the medical model, including reliance 
on institutional placement (Kennedy 1993).
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In addition, states typically have not provided adequate funding to 
meet the substantial need for such services and have developed a vari 
ety of rationing mechanisms to limit their financial responsibility. 
These include eligibility criteria that limit enrollment to those "at risk 
of institutionalization" or to people with physical disabilities; coverage 
rules that prohibit funding for certain nonmedical services; rules pro 
hibiting funding for assistants who are related to the recipient; limita 
tions in the number of hours of services covered; and restrictions 
concerning the site of services.
One reason for such approaches is that states are concerned over 
"the woodwork effect" (people who are receiving assistance from rela 
tives or friends coming "out of the woodwork" to request funding) and 
adverse selection (i.e., the tendency of disabled persons to move to 
those programs and insurance plans that offer the most generous bene 
fits that they need) (Batavia, DeJong, and McKnew 1992). For exam 
ple, it is generally acknowledged that many younger disabled persons 
decide to reside in California because it has a comprehensive in-home 
support services program based on the independent living model.
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Encourage Employment?
As in the case of health insurance, the extent of the work disincen 
tive is directly related to the generosity of the benefit. In those states 
with very generous personal assistance services programs, the work 
disincentive appears particularly strong. Personal assistance services 
are not covered under any private health insurance plans available 
through employment or in the individual market. 14 Consequently, if an 
individual were to eventually lose his or her personal assistance bene 
fit, he or she would require a very substantial income to be able to pay 
for such services out of pocket. Without having access to such services, 
the individual would have to rely on the assistance of unpaid friends or 
relatives, if available.
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How Can We Restructure Eligibility and Benefits 
to Encourage Independence ?
To meet the need for personal assistance services equitably, and to 
reduce adverse selection, a national personal assistance services policy 
is needed (Batavia, DeJong, and McKnew 1992; Nosek and Rowland 
1993). Such a policy should provide a comprehensive approach to 
financing assistance services and helping disabled persons to recruit 
competent, dependable personal assistants. One national model is the 
Department of Veterans Affairs program, which provides funds directly 
for personal assistance services based on need to qualified disabled 
veterans, regardless of employment status. This model would have to 
be adapted to protect against the woodwork effect in serving the much 
larger civilian disabled population.
A possible approach would be to implement a system based on tax 
credits, MSAs, or vouchers, similar to that suggested for health insur 
ance. In one regard, this approach would be easier to apply to personal 
assistance because there are no significant barriers to purchasing such 
services through the general market. The primary challenge would be 
to develop an equitable and efficient mechanism that is not easily sub 
ject to fraud and abuse for purposes of determining the appropriate 
amount of the credit, MS A, or voucher.
Assistive Technology and Durable Medical Equipment
Just as personal assistance services can compensate for lost func 
tional capacity, assistive technology can also help people with disabili 
ties to live independently. In certain circumstances, it can even provide 
a cost-effective means of reducing the need for certain kinds of per 
sonal assistance. Examples of assistive devices used by people with 
disabilities include whfeelchairs, augmentative communication devices, 
page turners, environmental control units, and amplified listening 
devices (Seelman 1993).
Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey suggest that 
about 5 percent of the civilian noninstitutionalized population currently 
uses assistive devices, excluding eyeglasses (LaPlante, Hendershot,
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and Moss 1992). About 1 percent of the population indicated that they 
did not have at least one assistive device that they needed, primarily 
due to financial considerations. For many of these individuals, the abil 
ity to obtain such items would significantly enhance their ability to live 
more independently and productively.
How Do Disabled People Currently Receive Assistive 
Technology Benefits?
Medicare Part B covers the purchase or rental of certain devices that 
qualify as durable medical equipment (DME), such as wheelchairs. In 
addition, it covers prosthetic devices, orthotic devices, and certain 
medical supplies. Yet, DME suppliers received only 3.5 percent of all 
Medicare Part B payments in 1990. Medicare accounted for 17.8 per 
cent of DME, while private insurance paid 10.4 percent, and individu 
als paid 67.3 percent out of pocket. The vast majority of Medicare 
DME expenditures are for such medical equipment as oxygen, 34.4 
percent; prosthetics and orthotics 18.8 percent; and tube feeding 17.2 
percent (Committee on Ways and Means 1991).
States again vary as to the generosity of their Medicaid coverage, 
although this is generally limited to fairly basic durable medical equip 
ment. While motorized wheelchairs tend to be covered, most other 
devices that would support independent living are not. Those SSI 
recipients who are on the Plan to Achieve Self-Sufficiency (PASS) Pro 
gram may set aside funds to purchase assistive devices without com 
promising their program eligibility. Also, some state vocational 
rehabilitation programs provide assistive devices to support an educa 
tional and vocational strategy. However, most people with disabilities 
who need "nonmedical" assistive devices pay for them out of pocket.
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Provide Adequate Support?
Medicare does not pay for services or devices "which are not rea 
sonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury 
or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member." Many 
assistive devices are routinely disallowed because they are considered 
"convenience items." Motorized wheelchairs are denied to individuals
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who can operate a manual wheelchair in their homes, even if they 
would need the motorized wheelchair to transport themselves in their 
communities (Griss 1988, National Council on Disability 1993b).
As with health insurance and personal assistance, whether Medicaid 
beneficiaries receive the assistive devices they need depends on the 
state in which they reside (National Council on Disability 1993b). No 
state covers the full range of needed devices; items such as environ 
mental control units are virtually never included under state Medicaid 
plans. 15 Two significant policy barriers to obtaining assistive devices 
under Medicaid are the requirements that the recipient demonstrate 
"Medical Need" and obtain "Prior Approval" for the device. Interpreta 
tions of these requirements, and the extent of the barriers, vary from 
state to state (Seelman 1993).
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Encourage Employment?
The current system promotes employment to the extent that it pro 
vides individuals with the assistive devices they need to seek and main 
tain jobs. For the most part, individuals do not receive the work-related 
devices they need under Medicare or Medicaid. Conversely, the even 
tual loss of eligibility for these programs would consequently not 
impose a significant work disincentive, except to the extent that needed 
medical devices, such as oxygen, would be lost. For individuals with 
requirements for such covered durable medical equipment, the work 
disincentive is likely to be substantial. Again, the link between eligibil 
ity and employment is problematic.
How Can We Better Satisfy the Goals of Support and Employment?
The major difference to be considered in analyzing personal assis 
tance services and assistive devices is that some assistive devices are 
currently covered through private employer-based health insurance. 
However, this varies from plan to plan; very few health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) cover DME to the same extent that Blue Cross 
plans do. If other payers do not improve their coverage, Blue Cross 
may eventually have to cut back to remain competitive. From a policy 
perspective, this suggests that the playing field should be leveled
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among different health plans through a uniform minimum benefits 
requirement. If all private health plans covered DME, the work disin 
centive associated with such equipment would be reduced.
Another alternative would be to remove assistive technology and 
DME from the health care financing system and to subsidize them in 
another manner, such as through tax credits, MSAs, or vouchers. As 
with personal assistance services, this approach would give individuals 
with disabilities flexibility in choosing and obtaining the devices they 
need to live independently. Like personal assistance, it also raises con 
cerns as to how to restructure the financing of services. A major issue is 
how to determine the amount of the credit, MS A, or voucher.
Conclusions
The benefits that are provided in kind under the Social Security dis 
ability programs have a profound effect on the capacity of people with 
disabilities to live in their communities and to seek gainful employ 
ment. An analysis of how health insurance, personal assistance ser 
vices, and assistive technology are currently provided suggests that 
they satisfy the support goal to a greater extent than the employment 
goal. From the low numbers of beneficiaries who have left the disabil 
ity rolls, it now appears clear that further tinkering with the system's 
work disincentives is unlikely to achieve independent living objectives.
More fundamental change is necessary. We must reexamine the pre 
mises of the current system to determine whether they are consistent 
with the system's goals. Services that are currently provided in kind 
could be offered in a number of different ways. No special significance 
should be attributed to the fact that they are currently provided in kind 
except to the degree that they would otherwise not be available or 
affordable to people with disabilities. To that extent, reforms should be 
implemented to eliminate barriers to an accessible market for such ser 
vices. The focus must be on meeting the basic support needs of the 
individual while encouraging self-sufficiency.
The cash equivalent approach advocated in this paper is particularly 
compatible with these goals for two reasons. First, it is philosophically 
consistent because it treats people with disabilities in an integrated
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manner with other people while recognizing, through the subsidy, the 
additional financial burdens of disability. It thereby implicitly acknowl 
edges that disability is a normal aspect of the human experience. In 
contrast, the current system treats people with disabilities in a segre 
gated manner, as if they were a separate species. Second, the cash 
equivalent approach would require less bureaucracy because it would 
be administered largely through existing structures (i.e., the tax sys 
tem).
Whether we continue to provide services in kind or through vouch 
ers, MSAs, or refundable tax credits, the issue of eligibility will remain 
critical. This is particularly true if we divorce the benefits now pro 
vided in kind from the present cash benefit programs. Current mecha 
nisms for determining eligibility are grossly inadequate and are at odds 
with the goal of employment. New approaches, including different def 
initions and review methods, will be necessary to assure that only indi 
viduals with significant functional limitations are eligible for benefits 
and that these individuals receive the benefits they need to live inde 
pendently (Batavia and Parker 1995).
Linking eligibility to work is not necessary and is counterproductive 
to the extent that it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy convincing benefi 
ciaries that they are unemployable. There is no compelling policy ratio 
nale for providing benefits in kind, and by doing so we send the 
implicit message that we do not trust beneficiaries to make decisions 
for themselves. Alternatively, by providing cash equivalents regardless 
of employment status and phasing them out as income increases, we 
can offer people with disabilities greater control over their lives, and 
we are more likely to satisfy both the support and employment goals.
In pursuing this approach, it is essential to recognize that people 
with similar impairments and functional limitations can vary dramati 
cally in their need for services and that some mechanism would have to 
be devised to determine the appropriate amount of the credit, MSA, or 
voucher. Ideally, this determination should be based on a valid and reli 
able assessment of each individual's functional capacity and need for 
services. Unfortunately, we currently have only relatively simple, 
unsophisticated approaches to assessing functional status, based 
largely on ADLs that are subject to manipulation (Batavia 1992).
An alternative to basing a cash equivalent on functional assessment 
would be to use a significant cost-sharing requirement to induce indi-
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viduals to be cost conscious in their decisions. For example, we could 
permit a refundable tax credit for a specified percentage of service or 
coverage costs based on income (e.g., 90 percent for people with 
incomes up to 200 percent of the poverty level, 80 percent for incomes 
between 200 percent and 300 percent of the poverty level, etc.) up to a 
maximum amount (e.g., $15,000 per year). This approach raises cer 
tain equity issues that will have to be seriously considered in structur 
ing the credits, MSAs, or vouchers.
It must be emphasized that whether or not a cash equivalent 
approach will benefit people with disabilities will depend entirely on 
how it is structured. A poorly designed program using MSAs, for 
example, could lead to substantial adverse selection that could destroy 
the Medicare or Medicaid system. Careful attention must be paid to 
ensuring that a plan does not simply provide a windfall for those who 
are healthy, depleting the low risks from the general insurance pool and 
imposing higher costs on those who are less healthy (American Acad 
emy of Actuaries 1995).
While systematic reform is necessary, it need not occur all at once. 
Given the incremental nature of our political system, it would be pref 
erable to achieve these changes in several stages. A first stage might 
remove barriers to the establishment of a competitive market, in which 
people with disabilities would have access to services currently pro 
vided in kind. Subsequent stages might entail the creation of tax cred 
its, MSAs, or vouchers to offer greater access to these markets and 
might involve the implementation of demonstration projects to test 
these approaches.
Whichever specific approach is adopted, and however it is imple 
mented, we must boldly reform our disability programs. A system that 
does not service the long-term interest of its intended beneficiaries can 
not and should not be sustained.
NOTES
1 It is the author's belief that the vast majority of people with disabilities are capable of gain 
ful employment. Individuals with very substantial functional limitations, including respirator 
dependency, high-level quadnplegia, and mental retardation, have been able to remain productive 
in the public or private sector However, it is clear that some individuals, such as those with very 
severe brain damage, have disabilities that preclude employment.
2 In the worst-case scenario, policy makers are concerned that some beneficiaries may use the 
cash for entirely unjustifiable purposes, e.g., for the purchase of alcohol or illegal drugs Such rare
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situations, which are occasionally revealed through the press, can jeopardize support for an entire 
program.
3. An MS A is a tax-advantaged savings account, similar to an Individual Retirement Account 
(IRA), which could be used for certain specified purposes (e g., medical costs, long-term care, 
personal assistance services) and could accumulate from year to year (Goodman and Musgrave 
1992)
4. People with certain conditions, such as diabetes, spinal cord injury, and acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), statistically have higher than average health care costs. People with 
other disabilities, such as blindness, deafness, and mental retardation, have close to average costs, 
but are often perceived and treated by health insurers (defined broadly in this paper to include 
commercial insurers, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, managed care plans, and self-insured organiza 
tions) as costing more than average. Individuals in both groups find it difficult or impossible to 
obtain affordable health insurance unless they have access to a group policy.
5 Code of Federal Regulations (C F.R) 404 1505, 1995. Washington, DC. U S. Government 
Pnnting Office.
6. U.S C Section 1395, The Social Security Act, as amended, Title XIX, Section 1901 (as 
added July 30, 1965), Public Law 89-97 West Publishing Co 1992.
7. However, at the time of this writing, Congress is considering legislation that would give 
states far greater discretion in setting their Medicaid policies unencumbered by federal require 
ments.
8. While there are numerous possible explanations for the small number of beneficiaries who 
leave the rolls, I believe that it is a result of a combination of three factors: (1) the substantial psy 
chological investment that beneficiaries must make in initially demonstrating their inability to 
work in order to establish eligibility, (2) a basic distrust that the government will fulfill its end of 
the bargain to provide continuing benefits once they become employed or to reestablish their eli 
gibility if they lose their jobs, and (3) an inability to obtain equivalent benefits through employ 
ment.
9. One study has found that disabled persons employed part-time are significantly less likely 
to have any insurance coverage than those employed full-time or not at all, suggesting that dis 
abled individuals who cannot make the transition directly to full-time employment and those who 
are only capable of part-time employment are likely to have a substantial work disincentive 
(Burns, Batavia, and DeJong 1994).
10 The Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600 and S. 1757 (103rd Congress).
11 A bill based on this approach, the Consumer Choice Health Secunty Act of 1993, S. 1743, 
was introduced by Senator Don Nickles (Republican-Oklahoma) in the 103rd Congress, 1993.
12 Among the advantages of this approach are that it could be designed to offer universal cov 
erage, shift the system from employment-based to household-based, thereby offering full portabil 
ity of coverage when one changes employment status, provide the type of protection that is most 
needed, catastrophic and long-term care coverage; stimulate competition among health plans, 
thereby containing costs while maintaining access and quality; enhance consumers' cost con 
sciousness while maintaining their autonomy and control; and subsidize people who have undue 
financial burdens (Batavia 1993).
13 Under this model, personal assistance has been defined as "Assistance, under maximum 
feasible control, with tasks aimed at maintaining well-being, personal appearance, comfort, 
safety, and interactions with the community and society as a whole" (Litvak, Zukas, and Heu- 
mann 1987).
14 It is reported that some long-term care policies are beginning to offer personal assistance 
services as an option.
15. To the limited extent that they are available to people with disabilities using state funds, it 
is typically through the vocational rehabilitation system on a discretionary basis.
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